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CHAPTER 10
Pension Deals and Value-Based ALM
Niels Kortleve (PGGM)a,1 and Eduard Ponds (ABP and Netspar)b,1
JEL codes: G13, G23, H55 and M41
Abstract
High expected returns for equities do not imply that equities are more attrac-
tive. Value-based ALM shows that poor equity returns come in economic
bad times and that raising contributions and/or lowering beneﬁts (cutting
nominal beneﬁts or cutting indexation) is very expensive in these circum-
stances. Equities will often outperform the riskless asset and on average
result in cheaper funding and higher beneﬁts, but this is offset by poor times,
often even more than offset! Value-based ALM leads to the insight that cur-
rent stakeholders often lose by taking more risk in the form of investing in
equities. Next to that, investing in equities increases the size of ‘option sur-
plus’ and ‘option deﬁcit,’ the present value of future surpluses and deﬁcits.
Thereby the risk will increase and the sustainability of the pension deal
decreases since the future outcome can be very unattractive for one group
of stakeholders.
We will use the new approach of value-based ALM to investigate pension
deals ranging from pure deﬁned beneﬁt to pure deﬁned contribution and to
asset allocations of 100% in equities versus 100% in bonds. We will show
that seemingly attractive pension deals, that have for instance low average
contribution rates and high expected surpluses, may have low present values
for certain stakeholders. Value-basedALM will show who will gain and loose
aNiels Kortleve is a manager Actuarial Projects & Special Accounts for PGGM; bEduard Ponds is
head of strategy, Financial and Risk Policy Department, ABP and senior researcher for Netspar.
1We are very grateful to Theo Nijman for his comments, Elbert Schrier and Jeroen Trip for their
support in generating the results.182 N. Kortleve and E. Ponds
from changing the current pension deal. This information in our opinion will
help to construct a more sustainable pension deal.
Value-based ALM adds new information relative to classical ALM in the
form of present values of future cash ﬂows, the economic value of future
surpluses and deﬁcits as well as stakeholder information, showing the inter-
generational solidarity expressed in economic value terms. We think this
information should no longer be disregarded and should be included in
doing ALM and constructing pension deals in the future.
10.1. Introduction
In the pension industry, Asset Liability Management (ALM) is being used
to come to optimal pension deals. Board members of pension plans have to
decide what the optimal funding strategy, indexation policy and investment
strategy is for the fund, as well as how risks best can be shared over the
various stakeholders like members and sponsor. ALM outcomes could sug-
gest to increase contributions in periods of poor investment returns – and
for Deﬁned Beneﬁt plans low funding ratios – and to lower indexation or
even cut beneﬁts (in the case of Deﬁned Contribution). Within ALM, one
looks to the possible distributions amongst others contributions, indexation
and funding ratio to form an opinion on the attractiveness of the strategy
being considered.
Value-based ALM adds an extra, new dimension by showing the
present value – also called economic value – of all decisions about the
funding strategy, indexation policy and investment strategy. Using the tech-
niques described in the previous chapters,2 one can calculate the present
value of contributions (conditional), beneﬁts (including indexation) and
shortfalls/surpluses for the fund collectively and also for the various stake-
holders. This addition leads to at least two types of extra insights, which
we will discuss in more detail in Section 10.2. The main conclusions are
that economic value will lead to different insights in the attractiveness and
sustainability of a pension deal for the pension fund and for its stakeholders.
2See chapters of Hibbert et al. (2006) and Nijman and Koijen (2006) for technique and Exley
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Value-based ALM could thus lead to even better pension deals and risk
sharing within pension plans.
An extra reason for applying value-based ALM is the broad shift to fair
value that one can notice in (international) accounting standards and in super-
vision of pension funds and insurance companies.3 Fair value does not only
give relevant information for shareholders, but also for other stakehold-
ers like members and leads to more transparent and easier to understand
information about the pension deal. Supervisors are working on frameworks
incorporating fair value for both assets and liabilities, making value-based
ALM an even more sensible approach.
10.2. Characteristics of value-based ALM
What are the main characteristics of a value-based ALM approach for
strategic decision making by a pension fund? As the focus of analysis
of value-based ALM is economic value, the analytical framework of this
approach will therefore differ from standard ALM. Classical ALM usually
uses items like the expected value of core variables supplemented with one or
more measures of the degree of riskiness of those variables. Classical ALM
often makes use of techniques like Monte Carlo simulations to project these
distributions and to optimize the strategy of the fund. This output remains
useful because it provides insight in the distribution of future possible results.
One gets information on the probability of underfunding, the probability of
a high contribution rate or probability of a low indexation or no indexation
at all, and so on. This will give some idea as to the sustainability of the
pension deal in the long run.
Value-based ALM essentially uses the same output of scenario analysis
as classical ALM, however the future outcomes are discounted back to the
present with an appropriate risk adjusted discount rate. This is realized by
discounting with either deﬂators, risk neutral valuation or pricing kernels
(compare the contributions of Hibbert et al. (2006), and Nijman and Koijen
(2006) in this volume).
3Major trends are IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards) using fair value concepts and
supervision in countries in Europe. In the Netherlands the government and supervisor are working
on a fair value framework to be implemented January 1, 2007.184 N. Kortleve and E. Ponds
The shift from classical ALM to value-based ALM leads to at least two
typesofextrainsights. Theﬁrstnewinsightisthevaluethe(ﬁnancial)market
currently attaches to future cash ﬂows. ALM experts looked at averages,
shortfalls etc., but disregarded information given by ﬁnancial markets in
the form of the present value of the future cash ﬂows. Since the market
is risk averse, one can learn that a deal with low average contributions
can have a high present value for these contributions, especially if future
contributions can be high in expensive states as often is the case in periods
of low investment returns/funding ratios.4 The opportunity the fund has to
increase contributions in economic bad times will have a high present value
for the fund. Active members are the ones bearing this risk.
Value-based ALM can calculate the present value of cash ﬂows like con-
tributions and indexation since these cash ﬂows – in the approach we use
by making these contingent on the funding ratio – are linked to cash ﬂows
of ﬁnancial titles like equities and bonds. Even if these cash ﬂows are not
ﬁxed – like in the situation of conditional indexation based on an indexation
ladder (also see Section 10.6.4) – their present value can be calculated using
the concept of replicating portfolios (also see Exley (2006) in this volume).
A pension fund can thus value all options it is holding in the form of all
kinds of contribution and/or indexation policies.
In this chapter, apart from giving information about the present value of
future cash ﬂows in the form of present value of contributions and beneﬁts,
we also use ‘option surplus’ and ‘option deﬁcit,’ the present value of future
surpluses and deﬁcits. These in our opinion give far more relevant informa-
tion about the possible future surpluses/deﬁcits than the likelihood and the
depth of a possible shortfall or surplus.
The second new insight is that one can look at the stakes of various
parties joining the pension fund and that one can see the impact of changing
the pension deal on various stakeholders. This will help to formulate a more
sustainable pension deal and to avoid that one group, for instance the young
members, have to pay up for any shortfall but do not get compensated
in getting extra upside at the same time. The new pension deal can have
(substantial) negative impact on the present value for certain stakeholders,
in our experience this information is an important addition to classicalALM.
As to our knowledge, the paper of Chapman et al. (2001) is the ﬁrst
contribution in this ﬁeld. They apply the approach to strategic decision
4Also see Kortleve (2003).Pension Deals and Value-Based ALM 185
making within a company pension fund organising a deﬁned beneﬁt plan.
They model the fund not as a self-contained entity but simultaneously with
the sponsoring company. The analysis is focused primarily on transfers of
value between the shareholders and the pension fund participants. Ponds
(2003b) and Kortleve (2003, 2004) employ the value-based approach to
analyse transfers of value between old, young and future members within a
pension fund where risk have to be borne primarily by the plan members.
One may speak of intergenerational risk sharing that typically can be found
in industry wide pension plans (the Netherlands) and public sector pension
funds (UK, US, Canada). This contribution primarily is aimed at clarifying
the main differences between classical ALM and value-based ALM.
Apension fund is a zero-sum game in economic value terms. Achange in
the pension fund strategy (for example taking more or less investment risk)
does not create economic value, however it may lead to transfers of value
between stakeholders. Value-based ALM facilitates in clarifying who gains
and who loses in economic value terms from a given pension fund strategy
or from a change in the strategy.5 A pension fund being a zero-sum game in
value terms can be a positive-sum game in utility terms. The ﬁnal section
of this chapter discusses implications if one incorporates welfare aspects in
the analysis.
10.3. Characteristics of the pension fund
The pension fund has the following features:
1. Pension plan: average-wage plan with indexed liabilities. The indexation
may be conditional depending on the content of the Pension Deal. The
yearly indexation is aimed to follow the price inﬂation.
2. Liabilities: the valuation of the indexed liabilities is based on discount-
ing with the real interest rate.6 The duration of the indexed liabilities
is 21 years (at a real rate of 2%). 60% of the participants is pensioner
5Assuming stakeholders will not compensate these changes using ﬁnancial markets. If markets are
complete and frictionless markets and there are no transaction costs etc., stakeholders could for
instance use derivatives to hedge and offset the impact of the changes.
6Almost all Dutch pension plans assume nominal liabilities in accounting for their funding ratio
for the new solvency test.186 N. Kortleve and E. Ponds
or deferred. The remaining part of 40% comprises the (current and future)
active members.
3. Funding ratio: the initial real funding ratio is 100%. The real funding
ratio is deﬁned as the ratio of the value of the assets and the value of the
indexed liabilities.
4. Contribution rate: the base contribution rate has to meet the economic
costs (‘cost price’) of new liabilities accruing during one year of service
based on the relevant discount rate, i.e., the real rate. The funding method
is formulated for a going-concern pension fund: the base contribution rate
to be asked in the coming 40 years P∗
t is solved from the requirement
of a balance between the present value of new accrued liabilities in the




PV new liabilities 40 years
PV pensionable wages 40 years
Contributions are expressed as a percentage of the pensionable wage
income. As the target indexation is linked to the price inﬂation, the terms
in the above formula for the base contribution rate is calculated with the
expected real rate. The length of the 40 year period reﬂects the length of
one generation.
5. Asset mix: we consider just two variants in the asset mix: 100% nominal
bonds and 100% equities. The duration of the bonds is 5.3 years.
6. Policy horizon: we assume a policy horizon of 15 years.7 This means
that we assume a plan horizon of 15 years. During these 15 years new
beneﬁts are being built, beneﬁts will accrue with the indexation being
granted, the fund realizes investment returns etc.
7. Risk-bearing:8 employers (in this chapter) are no risk-bearing party. The
involvement of employers with the funding is restricted to paying con-
tributions from gross wage income. Hence, all the funding risks have to
7The 15-year period is the length of the recovery period that pension funds in the Netherlands will
be given to accumulate the required solvency buffer in case of a solvency deﬁcit.
8The spectrum of pension funds shows up a great variety in the nature of risk bearing because
the stakeholders are free in making rules as to who should bear the risks in the funding process.
However, one may distinguish two basic types. The ﬁrst one may be found in company pension
plans, where it is usually prescribed that the sponsoring ﬁrm is solely responsible for the funding
position. The second basic form can be found in public sector pension funds and industry pension
funds where the funding risks typically are borne by the members collectively.Pension Deals and Value-Based ALM 187
be borne by current and future members of the pension plan.9 In Sec-
tion 10.6 we will discuss four different variants of risk-bearing by the
plan members.
10.4. Framework of analysis
The balance sheet of a pension fund in economic value terms will look as
the one displayed in Figure 10.1. The represented terms are the economic
value expressions at t = 0 of the relevant variables at the end of the horizon
at t = T.
The term IndT may be negative or positive reﬂecting either a cut in full
indexation or additional indexation above full indexation. The term PT
also may be negative or positive reﬂecting either a reduction or an extra
charge to the cost price contributions. The term RT is the economic value of









A0        =   value of assets at t = 0
L0         =   value of accrued liabilities (with full indexation) at t = 0
nLT      =   economic value of new accruing liabilities during the period t = 0 to t = T
                 (with full indexation)
PT        =   economic value of contributions during the period t = 0 to t = T to fund the new
                 accruing liabilities nLT
∆IndT   =   economic value of additional indexation apart from full indexation during the
                 period t = 0 to t = T
∆PT      =   economic value of additional contributions apart from full cost price
                 contributions PT  during the period t = 0 to t = T
RT          =   economic value of funding residue at the end of year T
9This type of risk bearing is typical for industry pension funds in the Netherlands. There are around
80 industry pension funds in the Netherlands, covering almost 70% of the workers and more than
70% of total assets of Dutch pension funds of around 480 billion Euro (end of 2004). Around 25%
of the working force is participant in a corporate pension fund. The remaining 5% of the workers
has a deﬁned contribution plan (3%) or no plan at all (2%).188 N. Kortleve and E. Ponds
the residue at the end of year T, and it may be either positive or negative
as well.
As by deﬁnition the economic value of the cost price contributions equals
the value of the new liabilities to be built up during the horizon under con-
sideration, i.e., PT = nLT, and as the initial balance sheet at t = 0i s
identical to: A0 = L0 + R0, we can rearrange terms in the balance sheet of
Figure 10.1. to get the fundamental expression below reﬂecting the nature
of a pension fund of being a zero-sum game in economic value terms:
−PT + IndT + RT = 0
where:
RT = RT − R0
This expression also clariﬁes that a pension fund has three methods of
risk management:
1. Intertemporal spreading of risk: a funding surplus or a funding deﬁcit is
shifted forward in time. There is no active risk management at all.
2. Contribution adjustments: a funding surplus or a deﬁcit is absorbed by
workers via receiving a contribution cut or an extra contribution charge
respectively. Total contributions are equal to the cost price contributions
plus – some part of – the pension fund residue.
3. Indexation adjustments: the funding risks can be taken up by adjusting
the indexation rate so that total indexation is equal to the total aimed
indexation plus – some part of – the pension fund residue.10
The risk-adjusted discounting provides the economic value of the residue
(at t = T) of this distribution at t = 0, RT. The term RT can be split up in
two parts: the economic value of the surplus minus the economic value of
the deﬁcit.
RT = economic value surplus −/− economic value deﬁcit
at t = T at t = T
= option price at t = 0o f −/− option price at t = 0o f
surplus at t = T deﬁcit at t = T
10A fourth method may be reduction of nominal liabilities. Technically this may be processed by
allowing negative indexation. The latter is possible within deal 3 (see Section 10.6.3).Pension Deals and Value-Based ALM 189
The risk-bearing stakeholders have a call on the future surpluses and
these surpluses will be distributed amongst them according to the risk-
allocation rules of the pension deal in operation. In case of deﬁcits the
risk-bearing stakeholders have to make up the funding shortfall. This may
be interpreted as if these stakeholders have written a put with an exercise
price for the residue of zero, i.e., the economic cost of reinsurance against
deﬁcits at t = T. One may interpret the economic value of a surplus or a
deﬁcit as option premiums. Hence, the economic value of the surplus may
be seen as the option premium for a call on the surplus at the end of period T,
whereas the economic value of the deﬁcit may be interpreted as the option
price for a written put with an exercise price for the residue of zero.
10.5. Economic environment
10.5.1. Assumptions
The model being used for the calculations in this chapter is a modern ver-
sion of Timbuk1.11,12 The model is calibrated to the market prices as of
December 31, 2003.
The pension fund outlook with respect to the economic future is captured
in the expectations and volatility of the core economic variables as displayed
in Table 10.1. Note that it is assumed that the wage inﬂation is equal to the
price inﬂation, so the real growth rate of wages is zero.
10.5.2. Deﬂators
In this chapter we use deﬂators to discount the cash ﬂows to arrive at the
correct present value of these cash ﬂows. Either deﬂators, risk neutral valua-
tion or pricing kernels can be used to discount all kinds of future cash ﬂows,
including beneﬁts, contributions and asset returns.13 To get the present value
of a ﬁnancial title, one should multiply the possible cash ﬂows of that title
11One can download documentation from http://www.gemstudy.com/FairValueDownloads/
Timbuk1.pdf.
12For description of these types of models, also see the contributions of Hibbert et al. (2006) and
Nijman and Koijen (2006) in this volume.
13See contributions of Hibbert et al. (2006) for concept of various approaches and how these
approaches are linked to one another.190 N. Kortleve and E. Ponds
Table 10.1. Economic outlook
Economic variables Expected outcome1 Standard deviation
Inﬂation2 3.2 1.5
Nominal rate of interest 5.6 1.6
Nominal bonds3 5.4 4.7
Real rate of interest4 2.0 0.5
Equities 10.8 26.3
1Geometric returns.
2It is assumed price inﬂation and wage inﬂation are the same, i.e., there is no real wage
growth.
3Duration nominal bonds is 5.3 years, being the duration in the market.
410 year zero rate.
by the corresponding deﬂators:
PV = iCFi × pi × Di
Where
PV = present value
CFi = cash ﬂow in state i (assuming 1000 simulations, this can be
any of the simulations)
pi = probability of state i (e.g. 1 out of 1000)
Di = deﬂator for state i
Deﬂators will correct for the equity risk premium relative to risk free
assets. In other words, even though equities do show a higher expect return
and therefore generate higher cash ﬂows on average than bonds, the present
value of 100 Euros in equities is (of course) the same as the present value of
100 Euros in bonds. High cash ﬂows from equities will most of the time be
multiplied by low deﬂators, whereas low cash ﬂows will be multiplied by
high deﬂators, as one can also see from Figure 10.2. The correlation between
equity returns and deﬂators is negative, meaning that on average high equity
returns will be multiplied by low deﬂators and vice versa. So, very poor
equity returns of −50% can have a deﬂator of 3 or even more, whereas
very attractive equity returns of +100% have deﬂators of 0.5 or below.
For equities the present value of a cash ﬂow of 100 in poor times can be
10 times as high as in prosperous times. As one can see from the ﬁgure,
there is hardly any correlation between bond returns and deﬂators, which
means that high bond returns are – on average – not compensated by low
deﬂators and vice versa.Pension Deals and Value-Based ALM 191
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10.6. Variants in funding strategy and risk bearing
We will discuss four distinctive pension deals. This enables us to show
the impact of alternative pension deals on the value of the stakes of the
stakeholders. These deals differ as to the contribution policy, the indexation
policy, the asset mix and risk allocation.
With the term ‘pension deal’ we mean the contract between the pension
fundandthestakeholdersthatsetsoutthenatureofthepensionpromise(ﬁnal
pay or average wage, the nature of the indexation policy), the funding of this
promise and how the risks in the funding process are allocated (implicit or
explicit) amongst the stakeholders. An explicit pension deal has clear rules
prescribing who has to pay, when and to what extent in a deﬁcit situation.
These rules also set down who will beneﬁt, when, and to what extent in
a surplus situation. Below we discuss four examples of explicit deals. The
deals investigated are:
Variants in funding strategy and risk bearing
Pension deal Risk
management
Indexation policy Contribution policy
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Variants in funding strategy and risk bearing—Cont’d
Pension deal Risk
management






















10.6.1. Deal 1: No active risk management (Spreading risk over time/risk
spreading between generations)
Pension deal 1 is characterized by no active risk management at all. There
is no aim to correct the course of the funding ratio over time by making use
of either the indexation instrument or the contribution policy. Each year the
contribution rate is set equal to the cost price to fund new accrued liabilities
and every year the indexation follows the actual inﬂation (see Figure 10.3)
This deal has a maximum appeal on spreading risk over time, or in other
words on intergenerational risk-sharing. Actually, the pension fund relies on
an inﬁnite sequence of overlapping age-cohorts. Table 10.2 reﬂects the core
results in terms of expected values and riskiness of the variables for a mix
of 100% bonds and a mix of 100% equities, respectively. This is the usual
classical ALM output.
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Table 10.2. Classic ALM results deal 1




risk (st dev) 2.7 132.8
st dev D FR 1.0 45.0









catch up 0% 0%
As can be read from Table 10.2, the cost price contribution rate is slightly
higher than 21% of pensionable wages. Indexation is always linked to the
actual inﬂation, so the cumulative indexation has a full 100% match with
the target indexation. The mix consisting of 100% nominal bond delivers on
average a real rate of return of 2% as anticipated in setting the contribution
rate. Therefore the funding ratio on average remains stable over time. The
volatility in the funding ratio is quite low primarily because of the low risk
in the real rate and because of the high correlation between the real rate
and the nominal rate. The 100% bonds mix nevertheless will imply some
mismatch risk, ﬁrstly because the pay-off structure of nominal bonds differs
from the growth rate of indexed liabilities as there is no perfect correlation
between nominal rate and real rate, and secondly because the duration of
the liabilities is much higher than the duration of the bond mix.
The 100% equity mix gives prospect to a higher expected real return
compared with the real rate, so the expected funding ratio will increase over
time. This investment strategy implies a much higher risk proﬁle for the
stakeholders than the investment strategy with 100% bonds. This can be
checked with Table 10.2 by looking at the risk measures of the funding ratio
that quantify the spreading in the funding ratio, i.e., the standard deviation194 N. Kortleve and E. Ponds
of the funding ratio itself (almost 133% for equities and just 3% for bonds)
and of the change in the funding ratio in one year (45% for equities and just
1% for bonds).
Figures 10.4 and 10.5 show the development of the funding ratio for
the two investment strategies.14 The risky 100% equity strategy leads on
average to an increase in the funding ratio, and so to an increasing funding
surplus. The funding ratio of the low risky 100% bond strategy remains
stable over time.
Table 10.3 shows the results of value-based ALM. The balance sheets
reﬂect economic values. Note that the economic value of the funding residue
of both strategies is the same! This is to be explained by the high economic
value attached to underfunding and the low economic value of overfunding.
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14The graphs show the following percentiles of the probability distribution of the funding ratio: 1,
5, 10, 90, 95, 99 and the median.Pension Deals and Value-Based ALM 195
Table 10.3. Value-based ALM results deal 1
100% Bonds
Assets (A0) 100 Accrued liabilities (L0) 100
Contributions (PT) 90 New liabilities (nLT) 90
Additional contributions 0 Additional indexation 0




Assets (A0) 100 Accrued liabilities (L0) 100
Contributions (PT) 90 New liabilities (nLT) 90
Additional contributions 0 Additional indexation 0
Change residue (RT) 0
Option surplus 50
Option deﬁcit −49
The 100% equity strategy may lead to a lower probability of underfunding,
however when it occurs, underfunding may be sizeable and it most likely
will happen in expensive states when stakeholders will not be able and
willing to make up for shortfalls. It is very expensive to hedge a situation of
underfunding. The deﬂator method attaches a high present value to outcomes
in economic bad times. Deep underfunding typically will occur in bad times.
The 100% bond strategy will have less underfunding in bad times, less both
in terms of frequency and depth.
Our conclusion is that the assumed attractiveness of equities, as can be
read from the classical Table 10.2, is not so attractive when viewed from the
perspective of fair value. Equities do not add economic value; they increase
the present value of future surpluses as well as the present value of future
deﬁcits!15 Fair value shows that taking risk does not increase the present
value.
15The higher the volatility, the higher the value of an option price.196 N. Kortleve and E. Ponds
10.6.2. Deal 2: Pure deﬁned beneﬁt
The characteristics of deal 2 are in line with a pure deﬁned beneﬁt scheme:
indexation is always given according to the promise and the contribution
rate is adjusted yearly in order to absorb the risk in the pension fund. The
target funding ratio is deﬁned as the 100% funding ratio, this is the situation
where the assets At are equal to the value of the indexed liabilities Lt, i.e.,
At/Lt = 100%. The contribution rate will be equal to the cost price when
the funding ratio is 100%. Any deviation between the actual and the target
funding ratio will lead to an adjustment in the contribution rate. There is a cut
in case of overfunding, whereas a charge is asked in case of underfunding.
Full adjustment of the funding ratio back to the target level in one year will
lead to extreme adjustments in the contribution. Therefore the fund aims
to reach the full funding situation after 40 years. So the restoration of any
deviation of the actual funding ratio from its target level is smoothed out
over a period of 40 years. Hence, the additional contribution rate apart from
the base rate, Padd




PV pensionable wages 40 years
The total contribution rate is equal to the sum of cost price contribution
rate plus the additional contribution rate:
Total Contribution Rate = P∗
t + Padd
t
Figure 10.6. Deal 2: Pure deﬁned beneﬁt




Inflation Pension Deals and Value-Based ALM 197
Table 10.4. Classic ALM results deal 2




risk (st dev) 2.5 118.5
st dev D FR 1 42.9









catch up 0% 0%
The classical ALM results are quite familiar (Table 10.4). The contri-
bution rate in the equity strategy displays on average a downward trend
(Figure 10.7). The on average high excess return in this strategy is translated
in cuts in the contribution rate. The average contribution rate drops from
21.4% to only 13.3%, though the latter has more dispersion and can be
higher than 30% in some more extreme cases. The bond strategy delivers
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no excess return, so the contribution rate in this strategy equals the cost
price contribution rate, which ﬂuctuates depending on the future real rate
(Figures 10.7 and 10.8).
When we compare the classical results of deal 2 with deal 1, we note
that the variability in the funding ratio has declined somewhat due to the
shifting of part of the mismatch risk towards the contribution rate and thus
to (future) active members. This may be seen from the value-based results
as well (Table 10.5).
The decline in variability of the residue is also reﬂected in the option
values of a surplus or deﬁcit. These values have decreased due to the reduc-
tion in the dispersion of the funding ratio. Furthermore, note that the value
of additional contributions (cuts as well as charges) is positive, i.e., active
workers will pay a higher contribution on balance in economic value terms
compared with deal 1. This is easily explained if one recognizes that contri-
bution charges typically will be asked in economic bad times and so these
charges may have a high economic value, whereas contribution cuts are
given usually in good times and so will have a low economic value. The
counterpart is that the economic value of the residue increases. The dis-
persion in the residue decreases in deal 2 compared with deal 1, and the
economic value of the decrease in probability and size of underfunding is –
in economic value terms – more valuable than the decrease in probability
and size of overfunding.
10.6.3. Deal 3: Collective deﬁned contribution
Deal 3 may be seen as the counterpart of deal 2. The contribution rate is
set equal to the base contribution rate and the indexation rate is used as thePension Deals and Value-Based ALM 199
Table 10.5. Value-based ALM results deal 2
100% Bonds
Assets (A0) 100 Accrued liabilities (L0) 100
Contributions (PT) 90 New liabilities (nLT) 90
Additional contributions 2 Additional indexation 0




Assets (A0) 100 Accrued liabilities (L0) 100
Contributions (PT) 90 New liabilities (nLT) 90
Additional contributions 2 Additional indexation 0
Change residue (RT) 1
Option surplus 22
Option deﬁcit −21
instrument to control risk. The indexation rate will be equal to the actual
price inﬂation when the funding ratio is equal to its target level of 100%.
Any deviation between the actual funding ratio and the target funding ratio
will lead to an adjustment in the indexation rate. The additional indexation
is calculated as the ratio of the residue to the present value of the projected




Note that to the analogy with deal 2, risk bearing is spread out over
current and future members as the restoration of any deviation of the actual
16The present value of the projected liabilities is the sum of the present value of the currently
accrued liabilities plus the present value of the new liabilities to be accruing in the coming
15 years.200 N. Kortleve and E. Ponds
funding ratio from its target is smoothed out over time, over already accrued
and newly accruing liabilities.
This deal implies that any deviation of the funding ratio of its target will
lead to a deviation between the aimed indexation and the actual indexation.
The 100% equity mix on average has a high return and this high return will
be given away in additional indexation. In 55% of the cases, the funding
ratio is above 100% and so the pension fund pays out more than just full
indexation (Figure 10.10). The relative pension result indexation reaches an
average value of 205%! The relative pension result is deﬁned as the ratio of
the actual pension result to the target pension result. However, the dispersion
is also very high as can be seen from Figure 10.11.
When we take notice of the economic value consequences of this deal,
then another picture arises. In 38% of the cases during the period under
consideration, assets fall below the value of nominal liabilities so then there
Figure 10.9. Deal 3: Collective deﬁned contribution
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is negative indexation, i.e., a cut in the accrued liabilities. In 7% of the cases,
the value of the assets falls between the value of the nominal liabilities and
the value of the real liabilities and so there is room for partial indexation.
Indexation cuts and negative indexation will occur in particular during bad
times. The economic value of these cuts therefore will be so high that they
by far outweigh the economic value of the additional indexation being given
in 55% of the cases.
This deal shows up a dramatic difference between classical and value-
basedALM (see Tables 10.6 and 10.7). Value-basedALM shows once again
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Table 10.6. Classic ALM results deal 3




risk (st dev) 1.1 26.9
st dev D FR 1.3 33.1




Relative pension result 100% 205%
Indexation
negative 10% 38%
less than full 43% 7%
more than full 47% 55%202 N. Kortleve and E. Ponds
Table 10.7. Value-based ALM results deal 3
100% Bonds
Assets (A0) 100 Accrued liabilities (L0) 100
Contributions (PT) 90 New liabilities (nLT) 90
Additional contributions 0 Additional indexation −2




Assets (A0) 100 Accrued liabilities (L0) 100
Contributions (PT) 90 New liabilities (nLT) 90
Additional contributions 0 Additional indexation −2
Change residue (RT) 4
Option surplus 18
Option deﬁcit −14
that the extra indexation comes in good times, so the present value of these
55% of the scenarios does not outweigh the other 45%; the present value is
the same for the portfolio of 100% bonds and of 100% equities.
10.6.4. Deal 4: Policy ladder
A number of Dutch pension funds recently has introduced a so-called policy
ladder, in Dutch ‘Beleidsstaffel’(Ponds, 2003a). We may interpret the ladder
as a combination of components of the two preceding deals. The basic idea
of the ladder is quite simple. We explain the basic idea with the help of
Figure 10.12. Two points are of crucial importance, the upper bound and the
lowerbound. Itisassumedinthischapterthattheupperboundisthesituation
where the real funding ratio is 100%, this is when the assets exactly match
the value of the indexed liabilities. The lower bound is the situation where the
nominal funding ratio is 100%, i.e., the value of the assets is the same as the
value of the nominal liabilities (thus no indexation). The difference betweenPension Deals and Value-Based ALM 203
















the upper bound and lower bound is the necessary indexation reserve needed
to pay for the future indexation of the accrued liabilities. This indexation
reserve can also be expressed as the difference between the value of indexed
liabilities (based on the real yield curve) and the value of nominal liabilities
(with valuation based on the nominal yield curve).
The contribution rate and the indexation are set along the vertical axis.
Indexation policy: The magnitude of the indexation is related proportion-
ally to the size of the available indexation reserve, this is the difference
between assets and nominal liabilities. There is room for full index-
ation, if and when the value of the assets equals the value of fully
indexed liabilities. In this case, the actual indexation reserve matches
the required indexation reserve. The indexation rate will be zero when
the assets are equal to or even below the present value of the nominal
liabilities. The indexation reserve then is actually zero or even negative.
Between these points there will be an indexation cut where the size of
the cut is related to the actual deﬁcit in indexation reserve. Whenever
the value of the assets exceeds the value of indexed liabilities, there
is room to provide extra indexation until there is a full catching-up of
previously missed indexation.204 N. Kortleve and E. Ponds
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Contribution rate: The contribution rate is set equal to the cost price of
the new accrued liabilities of one year of service when the funding
ratio is equal to or is higher than 100%.17 A contribution charge is
levied when assets fall short of the indexed liabilities. To the analogy
with the indexation cut, the charge will increase when the deﬁcit is
increasing. The maximum charge is determined by the annual funding
costs in order to build up the required indexation reserve within 40 years
(Figures 10.13 and 10.14).
From the classical ALM results we make up that the 100% bonds strat-
egy on average yields a funding ratio of around 100% (Table 10.8). The
contribution rate is on average around the cost price level. The median
17The pension fund could also decide to cut the contribution below cost price, when the plan is
overfunded (i.e., funding ratio is higher than 100%).Pension Deals and Value-Based ALM 205
Table 10.8. Classic ALM results deal 4




risk (st dev) 2.5 131.8
st dev D FR 1 45.2
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cumulative indexation equals 100%, being the result of both indexation cuts
and catch-up indexation. The 100% equity mix will lead on average to an
ever increasing funding ratio as the expected high equity return cannot be
translated in cuts in the contribution rate as in deal 2 or in additional index-
ation as in deal 3. The average funding ratio is increasingly much higher
than 100%.206 N. Kortleve and E. Ponds
The value-based ALM results make clear that the 100% equity strategy
does not necessarily imply better results in economic value terms. After
adjusting the future results for the high risk involvement it becomes clear
that the costs of additional contributions and indexation cuts are very high
and take away the general believed advantages of risk-taking. The high
equity returns turn up in economic times with low deﬂators and therefore
have limited present value, at least lower than their nominal cash ﬂows do
imply. The low equity returns coincide with high deﬂators as well as with
higher contributions and lower indexation. So when equities perform poor,
the members are hurt by extra payments to the fund and lower pensions out
of the fund (Figure 10.15).
Further note that with 100% equities the current stakeholders are losing
economic value (compare 100% equities with 100% bonds in Table 10.9).
There is an increase of +20 in the value of the future residue in comparison
with deal 1. This increase is primarily due to indexation cuts during bad
periods for equity investments (note the additional indexation is –16, also
Table 10.9. Value-based ALM results deal 4
100% Bonds
Assets (A0) 100 Accrued liabilities (L0) 100
Contributions (PT) 90 New liabilities (nLT) 90
Additional contributions 1 Additional indexation 0




Assets (A0) 100 Accrued liabilities (L0) 100
Contributions (PT) 90 New liabilities (nLT) 90
Additional contributions 6 Additional indexation −16
Change residue (RT) 20
Option surplus 50
Option deﬁcit −31Pension Deals and Value-Based ALM 207






2004 2009 2014 2019
year










1888 1898 1908 1918 1928 1938 1948 1958 1968 1978 1988 1998
Year of Birth
 
see Figure 10.16) and also because of extra contributions during these bad
periods (note additional contribution is +6, also see Figure 10.14).
Figure 10.17 clariﬁes who is paying for this increase in the funding
residue. We have displayed the change in economic value per age cohorts
when the pension fund steps over from deal 2 (or deal 1 or deal 3) to deal 4.
We see that all cohorts lose economic value by this change. The fund col-
lectively beneﬁts, since the present value of the residue increases relative
to the previous deals. Future generations will be more willing to join this
deal since the present value for them more likely will be positive. Why do
current members lose on average? Active workers have to pay additional
contributions when the funding ratio falls below the upper bound, however208 N. Kortleve and E. Ponds
there are no contribution cuts when the funding ratio is higher than the upper
bound. So workers pay on balance more contributions in deal 4 compared
to Deal 2. There are indexation cuts when the funding ratio falls short of the
upper bound. Catch-up indexation is given when the funding ratio is recov-
ered above the upper bound. On balance, cohorts will lose economic value
because there will be scenarios where indexation cuts have been passed but
catch-up indexation has not been given yet or only partially. Extending the
horizon will lead to a decrease in the shortage. The relative reduction in
shortage for a speciﬁc cohort will be larger the younger a cohort is.
10.7. From value to welfare
An important result of value-based ALM is that it shows that a pension
fund is a zero-sum game in economic value terms. This insight may sug-
gest that any pension fund policy only implies transfers of value amongst the
stakeholders which do not have any role (cf. Exley, 2004). However this con-
clusion neglects the welfare aspects of pension funds. Indeed pension funds
are potentially welfare-enhancing because pension funds aim to offer retire-
ment income products which are not available in the market.18 Although the
offered insurance may differ amongst the various pension funds, the aim of
the different pension deals is to enable the participant to go on with the stan-
dard of living before retirement after one is retired. This kind of ‘insurance’
offers protection against the risk that the purchasing power of pension sav-
ings is eroded by inﬂation and also against the risk that pension savings do
not hold pace with the real growth of the economy, i.e., the general standard
of living. From the literature, it is well-known that these types of insurance
can be organized by intergenerational risk-sharing. Just because the mar-
ket fails to organize this kind of risk-sharing, pension funds are potentially
welfare-enhancing (Gordon and Varian, 1988; Shiller, 1999; Ponds, 2003b).
Cui et al. (2005) developed a framework wherein pension funds can be eval-
uated in economic value terms as well as in utility terms. The utility analysis
clariﬁes the welfare aspects of pension funds. They show ﬁrst that in utility
terms a pension fund as a risk-sharing arrangement is more useful than an
18Even if markets are complete and stakeholders do have full insight in and understanding of their
stakes (i.e., contributions, beneﬁts and indexation), cutting costs, sharing risks and other arguments
still seem to favour collective pensions over individual pensions.Pension Deals and Value-Based ALM 209
individual pension saving program without risk-sharing opportunities (indi-
vidual deﬁned contribution plan), and secondly that pension deals being
performed by pension funds are ranked higher in utility terms the more they
contribute to safe and smoothed consumption patterns over the life-cycle of
the involved participants. Indeed a pension fund always is a zero-sum game
in value terms, however it is potentially a positive-sum game in welfare
terms.
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